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INTRODUCTION 
 
In respect of environmental politics, there are a number of ways one might 
characterise the state we find ourselves in.  One would simply be to highlight the 
perilous state of the planet in light of human behaviour associated with industrialisation 
and urbanisation (Global Biodiversity Outlook 4 2014; IPCC, no date).  Another would 
be to highlight the difficulties we seem to face in responding to these challenges.  The 
Paris Agreement of 2016 was an important step forward but there remain profound 
questions about implementation and not just because of the withdrawal of the US 
under President Donald Trump (Anderson 2015; BBC 2017; McGrath 2017).  Related 
to this, ecology or environmentalism still seems to be regarded in certain quarters as 
a bit of a fringe activity – remarkably in the circumstances.  We see this at a popular 
level in terms of a certain societal irritation with those who bang this drum.  However, 
we also see it at an academic level, where within development studies, 
environmentalism is still not entirely mainstream.  For example, in certain development 
journals, it is not uncommon to find articles which simply seek to understand the 
determinants of economic growth without any reference to whether it is reasonable to 
think about ‘development’ simply in terms of growth (Ahlerup et al 2016; Brandt and 
Thun 2016; D’Agnostino et al 2016; Havranek et al 2016; Neves et al 2016; Prieger et 
al 2016; Wilson 2016).   
 
Beyond this seeming ‘business as usual’ perspective, two other perspectives 
commonly dominate.  One is the so-called green capitalism or green growth 
perspective, which argues that with the help of technology and the knowledge 
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economy, economic growth can be maintained while also safeguarding the planet 
(Brockington 2012; Lander 2011; Sachs 1999).  The other perspective is that of 
degrowth.  Degrowth takes the opposite perspective, arguing that it is fanciful to think 
that technology can save the day, and advocates instead that we need to de-grow, 
whatever exactly that means (Demaria et al 2013; Fournier 2008; Kallis 2011; 
Martinez-Alier 2009; Martinez-Alier et al 2010; Splash 2015).  The green growth 
perspective has the ear of policymakers to the extent that anyone does.  Degrowth, 
meanwhile, is generally confined to the side-lines and is often ridiculed by more 
‘mainstream’ voices.  The field is, therefore, polarised.  People tend to inhabit one or 
other of the camps and it is rare to encounter scholarship which seeks to have a 
conversation across or between diverse perspectives. 
 
It is, however, the relative polarisation of the environmental politics field which provides 
the backdrop and starting point for this Review Essay.  For this author, the polarisation 
is puzzling.  How is it that on something as fundamental as the future of our planet, we 
are so divided?  Is it not possible to see the future a little more clearly?  Reviewing 
four recent books in the field, which cover a diversity of views, the essay lays the 
arguments of the green growth and degrowth perspectives alongside each other.  In 
contrast to some other literature, it seeks not to be too quick to dismiss one approach 
or another but instead wishes to clarify the points of disagreement and the reasons for 
them.  More than this, the essay is open to the way in which on closer scrutiny both 
the green growth and the degrowth approaches may in fact be found to be deficient.   
 
The essay is structured as follows.  After reviewing two books in the green growth 
tradition, we then review a book written from a degrowth perspective.  We then take 
stock of what we have learnt before introducing a fourth text (Parallax of Growth), 
which introduces a fresh perspective into the debate and points us in new and exciting 
directions.  Finally, we pull together our findings in the Conclusion.  The essay’s 
argument is that while there is a tendency for policymakers and scholars to gravitate 
either to the green growth or degrowth camps, both approaches leave important 
questions unanswered, notably in terms of explaining our preoccupation with growth.  
The essay concludes that unless we understand better why we are so attached to 
growth the prospects for tackling the environmental challenges we face are dim.  This 
is where further work is required, including thinking through how such arguments 
should be articulated to doubting publics. 
 
GREEN GROWTH:  A WIN-WIN PERSPECTIVE?  
 
Green Capital, co-authored by Christian de Perthuis and Pierre-Andre Jouvet, and 
Rethinking Capitalism, edited by Michael Jacobs and Mariana Mazzucato, are books 
by economists and are firmly located in the ‘green growth’ camp.  While the books 
complement each other, their strengths lie in different areas. Green Capital’s 
contribution lies in encouraging us to think of the environment not as a ‘scarce 
resource’ as is usual in economics but rather as a series of ‘regulatory systems’ that 
help protect our ‘natural capital’, understood as the stock of natural ecosystems that 
generate a flow of valuable goods and services (pp. 1-2).  Drawing on work by the 
Stockholm Resilience Centre, they define these regulatory systems as a series of 
planetary boundaries, the crossing of which risks abrupt and irreversible 
environmental damage.  One of these regulatory systems is the climate system but 
the book reminds us – helpfully given recent heavy focus on climate change – that 
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there are eight other regulatory systems, namely ocean acidity; the ozone layer; 
atmospheric concentrations of natural and man-made gases/particles; the 
maintenance of biodiversity; soil fertility; the freshwater cycle; the accumulation of 
certain kinds of chemicals; and the phosphate and nitrogen biochemical absorption 
cycles (pp. 51-53).  
 
De Perthuis and Jouvet’s point is that because historically we have not put a price on 
natural capital, or rather its damage, it has not been taken into account in investment 
decisions, for which we are now paying the price.  Their response is to introduce 
damage to natural capital as a third factor of production in investment decisions, 
placing it alongside the usual other two, namely capital and labour.  While some 
progress has been made in terms of a tax on C02 emissions (the so-called carbon tax), 
it is still very tentative while in respect of putting a price on damage to other regulatory 
systems we have scarcely begun (Clark 2016). 
 
The effect of not putting a price on damage to natural capital can be illustrated most 
clearly with reference to so-called peak oil (i.e. the point at which oil extraction would 
start to decline owing to a fall-off in recoverable supplies).  The irony is that peak oil 
predictions have repeatedly been put back not only because of improved extraction 
techniques but also because whenever the price of oil rises in the face of supply 
shortages it becomes commercially viable to extract oil from hitherto too difficult to 
reach locations.  This is precisely because the market is operating with just two factors 
of production rather than three.  If one set the carbon price correctly, eventually, 
regardless of the oil price, stocks would stay in the ground, or at least they would 
(some say) until we have developed viable forms of carbon capture.  Meanwhile, the 
idea is that putting a price on, say, C02 emissions would encourage companies to 
invest in alternative energy sources, such as renewables.  Green Capital is really 
about the ins and outs of how one does this – how you fix the carbon price, the difficulty 
of putting a price on some of the other regulatory systems, the question of who pays 
(e.g. capital, labour or both), and the consequences of such a transition for 
competitiveness and equity.  For de Perthuis and Jouvet, noting the rather ubiquitous 
use of the ‘green’ label, green growth is only truly green when it puts a price on natural 
capital. 
 
Continuing in the green growth paradigm, Rethinking Capitalism introduces itself as 
being concerned with failure – two failures in fact:  first, the “near collapse” of Western 
capitalism in the 2007-2008 financial crash, and its ongoing problems since then, 
including uncertain growth prospects, levels of inequality not seen since the nineteenth 
century, and serious global environmental pressures, notably climate change.  The 
second failure which Rethinking Capitalism examines is the failure of most economists 
to see the 2007-2008 crash coming.  The book argues – refreshingly given the rather 
establishment pedigree of its authors – that mainstream economic thinking of the neo-
classical kind which has dominated policymaking since the Reagan/Thatcher eras is 
not up to the task of understanding the multiple crises which contemporary economies 
now face, including dangerous environmental risk.  What is needed is a much more 
sophisticated understanding of how markets work, including the businesses within 
them.  “Capitalist economies are not theoretical abstractions,” they write, echoing Karl 
Polanyi and the more recent evolutionary, institutional and post-Keynsian schools of 
economics.  Rather, markets are “complex and dynamic systems, embedded in 
specific societies as well as in environments governed by biophysical laws.” (pp. 17-
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18).  Furthermore, their problems are not failures of markets which ‘normally’ succeed 
but are intrinsic to the very character of markets as they have been established (p. 
18).  Rethinking Capitalism seeks to follow through on these insights looking at areas 
ranging from macroeconomic policy to public sector outsourcing and inequality and 
economic growth.  Not all the book’s chapters are directly pertinent to this review.  
However, a number are, notably those dealing with questions of technological and 
organisational innovation, which seek to explain how a green transition might take 
place.   
 
From a green growth perspective, innovation is critical if we are to reduce and 
eventually eliminate greenhouse gas emissions and hence limit dangerous climate 
change.  Dimitri Zenghelis, former head of the Stern Review Team at the Office of 
Climate Change in London, who authors a chapter on decarbonisation and innovation, 
argues that very shape and structure of capitalism will need to change if we are to 
control greenhouse gas emissions sufficient to limit a rise in global temperatures to 
2oC above pre-industrial levels.  His point is that this will not be achieved unless there 
is a “profound change” in the way in which goods and services are produced, 
distributed and consumed – a demanding task if ever there was one.  As Zenghelis 
reminds us, climate change is a collective action problem, a tragedy of the commons.  
To decarbonise, one needs to build what are presently more expensive energy, 
transport, industrial, agricultural and urban systems.  As one does this, assets and 
activities based on fossil fuels will decline in value, meaning that any such transition 
will face opposition.  However, climate change also suffers from ‘the tragedy of the 
horizon’, namely that because the benefits will principally accrue to future generations 
it is hard to persuade people to act now. 
 
So, how will this transition occur?  Key, Zenghelis says, is the right combination of 
policies required to cut greenhouse gas emissions.  Like de Perthuis and Jouvet, 
carbon pricing is one of these policies, he says.  However, there are others as well, 
including regulatory measures such as energy efficiency standards and, crucially, 
innovation policy such as R&D expenditure and deployment subsidies where 
technological and structural change is required.   
 
A recurring theme in Rethinking Capitalism is the central role of government in any 
kind of transition.  Underlining the extent to which mainstream economic thinking has 
evolved, this includes ‘picking winners’ – to echo classic developmental state language 
– where the state identifies and supports companies expected to lead the way in 
developing new technologies and markets.  If the state is to drive innovation in a low 
carbon direction it needs to support it through funding policy in both R&D and 
deployment, Zenghelis says.  This is because investment in new fields carries high 
start-up costs and risks.  In terms of the balance between expenditure on R&D and on 
deployment, the received wisdom is that twice as much investment is needed in R&D 
than deployment.  However, in practice, government funding is usually massively 
skewed towards deployment. 
 
It is not just about government policy though.  It is also about politics.  This includes a 
willingness on the part of government to take on entrenched interests and not give in 
to incumbent lobbies.  It also includes providing support to companies as they 
transition into cleaner sectors or to support the redeployment of labour where 
companies cease operating altogether.  Industry will protest, Zenghelis notes, in the 
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face of climate change policy, arguing that it will make them uncompetitive or force 
them to relocate elsewhere but the reality is that under pressure innovation will occur.  
He cites the European car industry, which has successfully cut vehicle emissions,  by 
way of an example (pp. 184-185).  The key in all this is consistency – i.e. consistent 
and credible policy signals over time.  This way, the necessary investment in 
innovation and technology will take place. 
 
Can the necessary technological breakthroughs be achieved at the required speed?  
For Zenghelis, the outlines of such a transformation are already visible (e.g. nuclear 
and renewable energy combined with electricity storage, electric vehicles and/or the 
use of hydrogen cells based on clean energy sources, smart buildings, transport 
systems and cities, and greater energy efficiency).  Ultimately though, we won’t know 
if the technological breakthroughs are possible until we try, Zenghelis says.  However, 
he is scathing of those who think we cannot do it: 
 
“No economic modeller has more than the faintest ability to predict the 
technologies which will be available for emissions reductions even forty years 
hence, let alone eighty; and even less their costs” 
 
He continues:   
 
“Assuming that after eighty years of investing in and learning from technologies to 
harness and store renewable energies, it will still be cheaper to extract, transport 
and burn fossil fuels, is akin to predicting in 1900 that the costs of moving from 
the horse and cart to the combustion engine would be prohibitive, based on 
anticipated technologies at the time” 
 
What about the implications for economic growth?  Here Zenghelis is also optimistic 
(like others in the book and also his fellow travellers de Perthuis and Jouvet).  
Challenging the view that remaining within the planet’s ecological limits will mean an 
end to growth, he argues that decarbonisation is possible while maintaining economic 
growth for two reasons:  firstly, growth will continue as we harness non-carbon-based 
sources of energy, notably solar and wind resources; and secondly, the transition of 
economies towards knowledge capital and information-based goods and services will 
also drive growth (p. 177).  Green growth advocates do not believe that economic 
growth can defy the laws of thermodynamics.  That is, they accept that the material 
economy must eventually attain a steady state in terms of the sustainable use of 
resources, and that the throughput of materials and energy and the resulting problem 
of waste disposal will remain a key issue.  However, they think that technological 
progress can in principle support continued growth in value “because the intellectual 
economy is unbounded” (pp. 177-178).   
 
Another important chapter in Rethinking Capitalism is the one by Carlota Perez, who 
offers an historical analysis of patterns of technological innovation.  Noting that we 
have seen five technological revolutions since around 1770, all of which have driven 
successive surges in development, she sees patterns in terms of how technology has 
been assimilated.  On the whole, it takes 50 or more years for each new technological 
breakthrough to truly permeate society/the economy, she says, with two distinct 
phases – an initial ‘installation’ phase and a subsequent ‘deployment’ phase when the 
fruits of the technology are more widely rolled out.  What is striking, Perez notes, is 
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that in all five technological revolutions, the installation phase has been accompanied 
by a bubble economy and subsequent collapse/recession, prior to the deployment 
phase.  In terms of our present ICT age – Perez’s fifth technological revolution which 
she dates to the launch of Intel’s microprocessor in 1971 – the assertion is that we are 
living through just this kind of recession following the Dot-com bubble of 1995-2001.  
(The previous boom/bust period was the 1920s/1930s which followed the launch of 
Ford’s Model T car ushering in the age of mass production.)   In terms of our present 
era, the cause for optimism, Perez says, is that each crash has been followed by a 
golden age – the most recent being the post-World War Two period.  Perez’ point is 
that the downturn creates the political conditions for the deployment phase.  However, 
again, the role of the state is important to guide the direction innovation takes and 
encourage investment as people are naturally risk averse in the wake of a downturn.   
 
As yet, the ICT revolution has done little to tackle unsustainable mass consumption 
associated with the post-war development model.  However, the deployment phase 
still has 20-30 years to run, Perez says, arguing that while we have seen a number of 
new products along with changed consumption patterns over the last two decades off 
the back of new technology, its ability to “transform” every single industry and activity 
is only in its “early stages” (p. 199).  Perez – like Zenghelis – is therefore optimistic 
about our ability to combine sustainability with growth through technological 
innovation, including reducing material and energy consumption and increasing the 
proportion of services and intangibles in GDP as well as in lifestyles (p. 200).  While 
there is much of insight in Perez’ writing, it is not always clear what practically the 
changes she anticipates will look like, especially how far this notion of ‘dematerialised’ 
living can actually be taken.  We will return to this later. 
 
DEGROWTH:  A MORE REALISTIC WAY TO GO? 
 
Degrowth, edited by Giacomo D’Alisa, Frederico Demaria and Giorgos Kallis, has 
come out of the Autonomous University of Barcelona, where all three editors are 
based.  It is written in the form of a quasi-dictionary with some fifty short chapters 
covering key concepts relating to the degrowth movement.  There are chapters on 
anti-utilitarianism, capitalism, conviviality, dematerialisation, growth, peak oil, basic 
and maximum income, eco-communities, urban gardening, and Buen Vivir (‘good 
living’).  Reading this book requires something of a gear change compared with the 
two previous books but it is a useful window onto some of the arguments in the 
degrowth field.  Moreover, it is worth taking time to understand what is being said as 
it is easy to mis-hear people writing from this perspective.  In part, this is because 
degrowth is about ‘decolonising an imaginary’ – i.e. the common-sense idea that 
economic growth is desirable.  (In this respect, degrowth has a lot in common with 
post-development, which is also about decolonising an imaginary.)  Therefore, if we 
find ourselves quickly dismissing degrowth, we need to at least entertain the possibility 
that we may be victims of the very colonisation of which they speak.  This does not 
mean ultimately that we have to agree with degrowth ideas but it is worth taking time 
to hear them, not least because they raise fundamental questions about things we 
take for granted.     
 
The first thing to note about degrowth is that it is a broad church, encompassing a wide 
of views and perspectives.  So, for example, while the book’s editors speak with a 
common voice, they acknowledge that among their contributors there is greater 
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diversity, which they see as healthy.  Degrowth, they say, “expresses an aspiration” 
(p. xxi).  It cannot be “pinned down in a single sentence” (p. xxi).  Rooted in the radical 
and critical tradition, it is a “frame” where different lines of thought, imaginaries and 
courses of action come together” (p. xxi).  Moreover, people coalesce around the 
degrowth umbrella for a variety of reason.  For some, it is about maintaining prosperity 
without growth.  For others, it is a quest for a more egalitarian society where capitalism 
and “its insatiable pursuit of expansion” is the source of the problem.  For others still, 
degrowth simply provides a focus for how they want to live (e.g. simplicity, conviviality 
etc). 
 
While degrowth first surfaced as an idea in the early 1970s with its origins in ecology, 
ecological economics and bioeconomics, it has experienced something of a revival 
since the 2000s, notably in Europe, and it is in this context that this book has emerged.  
For its editors, degrowth is not only about downscaling production and consumption 
to reduce the throughput of energy and raw material – although this is part of it.  It is 
also about doing things differently socially and politically (i.e. degrowth aims to be 
more all-encompassing).  The editors write: 
 
“In a degrowth society everything will be different:  different activities, different 
forms and uses of energy, different relations, different gender roles, different 
allocation of time between paid and non-paid work, different relations with the non-
human world” (p. 4) 
 
The wider social and political dimensions to the degrowth movement is further evident 
when the book’s editors elaborate on the rational for pursuing degrowth.  It is not just 
because of their sense of the planet’s ecological limits or their sense that sustainable 
development (or green growth) is an oxymoron.  Rather, degrowth is worth pursuing, 
they say, out of a desire for autonomy, which can mean a number of different things, 
ranging from freedom from wage labour, freedom from complex systems, which are 
viewed as non-egalitarian and undemocratic, or because degrowth simply points to a 
better way to live.   
 
Other reasons cited by the book’s editors to justify their stance include the view that 
growth, and its associated commodification, erode social relationships; that above a 
certain level growth does not increase happiness; and because growth, they say, is 
unjust.  On the latter point, they cite two reasons:  first that growth is sustained by 
“invisible reproductive work in the household”, especially involving women; and 
second because “growth benefits from unequal exchange between core and 
periphery” both within and between nations (p. 6).  (There is more to say on some of 
these points and we will come back to them.) 
 
On the so-called ‘green growth’ alternatives, the editors argue that while 
decarbonisation is possible in theory (e.g.  with the advance of cleaner or more efficient 
technologies), the degree of decarbonisation needed is so extensive, it is impossible 
to achieve in practice.  Here, they cite the level of decarbonsation achieved between 
1980 and 2007 and, on this basis, conclude carbon emission targets required by 2050 
to stem global warming cannot be achieved (p. 7).  They also comment that some of 
the claims of lower C02 emissions are misleading because sometimes they have been 
achieved by exporting polluting industries to other countries.  In addition, they question 
whether technological progress can deliver the sustainable solutions which are 
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anticipated, citing the so-called Jevons paradox, which says that the gains brought 
about by technological progress are often swallowed up by higher levels of 
consumption (p. 7).  An often cited example relates to cleaner cars with the argument 
being that gains from emission reductions have been eroded as the number of the 
cars on the road has risen.  Lastly, the degrowth authors of this book are unconvinced 
that the economy can be ‘dematerialised’ to the extent that green growth advocates 
say, pointing out that the service sector and/or the knowledge economy both rely 
heavily on rare materials and energy (p. 7). 
 
In terms of what a degrowth transition would actually look like and how it would occur, 
while in one sense the vision is clear – i.e. it would be world which used fewer 
resources – the fine details of any transition and what exactly it would look like are 
much less clear.  The editors themselves acknowledge that there is no agreement 
regarding the politics of how “alternative institutions imbued with degrowth values” 
would “replace current institutions of capitalism” (p. 14).  Moreover, while most 
degrowth advocates would argue that there is a “fundamental incompatibility” between 
capitalism and degrowth, there is no consensus within degrowth circles whether it 
should explicitly position itself against capitalism.  Various reasons are given for this 
although one is that as a ‘social movement’ degrowth emphasises principles of 
decentralisation and voluntarism rather than large-scale ‘revolutionary’ change (p. 62).   
 
One of the longstanding criticism raised about degrowth is that in parts of the world, 
notably in the global south, there is insufficient prosperity to recommend degrowth (i.e. 
degrowth would be very harmful in the face of continued poverty).  In response, the 
editors say that degrowth is necessary in the global north to “liberate ecological space” 
for the south to grow.  However, they also say that degrowth in the global north aims 
to “liberate conceptual space” for countries in the global south to find “their own 
trajectories” – i.e. not simply copying practices in the north (p. 5).  How this would 
happen – not least the (seemingly impossible) politics of it – is not discussed.  In the 
end, one is left with a sense that degrowth is something which is being pursued at a 
grassroots level – eco-communities, cooperatives, community currencies, spending 
more time operating outside the wage labour system – and that these things are 
important and meaningful.  However, it is hard to see what ‘scaling up’ would look like 
nor whether the editors of this book are interested in this at all. 
 
DEGROWTH AND GREEN GROWTH IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE:  
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
 
By looking at green growth arguments alongside degrowth arguments, several things 
come into view.  Firstly, we can see how the two approaches differ fundamentally 
regarding what technology can or cannot deliver.  However, the question is can we 
adjudicate between their arguments?  Degrowth advocates surely have a point when 
they invoke the Jevons Paradox (i.e. the idea that gains from cleaner technologies are 
often eroded by higher levels of consumption).  They are also right to raise questions 
about how far any dematerialisation of the economy can be taken (e.g. there are limits 
to how much we can dematerialise, say, our homes or transport systems even if it is 
possible to use less materials or make them smarter and/or more energy efficient).  
However, the editors of the degrowth book reviewed here are much less convincing 
when they cite data detailing the (slow) speed at which decarbonisation has occurred 
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to date, concluding on this basis that future decarbonisation targets cannot be met.  
Moreover, one can imagine future scenarios where the Jevons Paradox may not apply 
(e.g. some post-carbon futures).  In this respect, Rethinking Capitalism is more 
convincing in terms of setting out the way in which innovation and technology are likely 
to be able to help us tackle the environmental challenges we face.  Rethinking 
Capitalism is also helpful in detailing the important role for the state in such any kind 
of ‘green’ transition.  Degrowth is less convincing and comes across as ideological 
when it invokes old dependency theory arguments about the harmful effects of growth 
for ‘the periphery’, in turn failing to acknowledge contemporary research in this area.  
It is not that the development of some areas of the world is not happening at the 
expense of other areas but the picture is mixed and some development at the 
‘periphery’ is almost certainly self-sustaining (Asche and Schuller 2008; Fantu and 
Cyril 2010; Gu et al 2016).   
 
None of the books reviewed so far – either on the green growth or the degrowth side 
of the debate – say very much about the implications of their analysis for poverty and 
inequality.  Such issues do not feature at all in the writing of Zenghelis and Perez.  
Instead, there is an untested assumption that innovation and technology will 
‘somehow’ deliver their benefits universally.  Moreover, Degrowth says nothing about 
the implications of degrowth in the global north – if it were to happen – on the poorest 
in the north.  However, the lesson of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, and subsequent 
austerity, is that slower growth in the north falls disproportionately on the poorest 
(Peebles 2015).  Lastly, Degrowth offers no insight into how degrowth in the north 
would occur (i.e. who would agree to it and in what circumstances?) such that it 
remains an entirely hypothetical notion.   
 
We now consider our final text, asking – counter-intuitively – what green growth and 
degrowth have in common and what questions they ignore?  
 
BREAKING OUT OF THE GREEN GROWTH vs DEGROWTH PARADIGM 
 
In Parallax of Growth, Ole Bjerg, who is from the Copenhagen Business School, 
addresses specifically the ‘standoff’ between green growth and degrowth and finds 
both wanting.  Instead of green growth and degrowth, Bjerg offers what he calls eco-
analysis which seeks to create space for critical thinking in a climate dominated by a 
call to action.  This is not because action is unimportant but rather because we need 
be “open and honest enough” to admit that we do not know what kind of action is 
required (p. 4).   
 
Exploring the etymology of the words ‘economy’ and ‘ecology’, Bjerg notes that eco – 
i.e. what eco-nomy and eco-logy have in common – is derived from the Greek oikos, 
meaning household, house or habitat.  So, eco-analysis is concerned with an analysis 
of “the place where life takes place” (p. 5).  The book draws heavily on the work of 
Slavoj Zizek and his distinction between the real, the symbolic and the imaginary.  For 
Bjerg, the eco- is the (elusive) ‘real’.  The economy and ecology are both symbolic 
realms and the imaginary is the ‘ideology’ which accompanies the symbolic, 
preventing us – most of the time – from seeing how things truly are.   
 
In Zizek terms, there is always something traumatic about the real (‘a traumatic real 
kernel’), which is too much for us to bear, which is why the symbolic and imaginary 
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exist.  The traumatic real of the ‘economy’. Bjerg says, is that value and price are not 
the same thing – contrary to what we say.  However, if we do not proceed as if value 
and price are the same we come up against the law of impossible exchange and the 
economy cannot function.  That is, we must be able to put a price on, say, a quantity 
of Honda motorbikes and a quantity of steel (i.e. the law of possible exchange) and 
say their ‘value’ is the same even though the grounds for saying this is questionable.  
The traumatic real of ‘ecology’, Bjerg says, is that there is no balance in nature and 
that human beings are not outside of nature – as ecology assumes – but are a part of 
it and are destroying it.  This is traumatic, Bjerg says, because if humans are part of 
nature and destroying it, then it is less clear on what grounds one can appeal to 
humans to clean things up (p. 27).   
 
Turning to the relationship between green growth and degrowth, Bjerg argues that 
even green growth critics are operating within the framework of the question posed by 
green growth advocates, namely how is it possible to continue to grow in a way which 
guarantees the continued availability of the natural assets on which growth depends.  
The only difference, he says, is that green growth critics answer the question in the 
negative as opposed to the affirmative (p. 145).  Eco-analysis, by contrast, poses and 
seeks to answer a different question, namely why is it that we are so attached to growth 
in the first place.  This approach is refreshing and one which one does not find in the 
other books. 
 
In taking this line, Bjerg is not saying that green growth is not better than brown growth 
nor is he taking issue with degrowth’s questioning of the merits of growth itself.  
However, understanding why we are so attached to growth is critical if we are ever 
going to move away from it.  A failure to understand why we are so attached to growth 
lies behind the relatively poor take-up of environmental measures historically whether 
it be at a global or a personal level.  For example, we have known what the problems 
are since the publication of the Brundtland Report in 1987 but 30 years on we are still 
debating many of the same issues and in large respects have not acted (pp. 35-36).  
Also relevant, in terms of our failure to act, is the disconnect between scientific 
knowledge and public perception.  Eco-analysis  does not deny the validity of scientific 
knowledge but it does seek to explain the disconnect between it and public perception.  
For Bjerg, a key issue is what he calls the ‘peculiar ontology of the human subject’, 
namely that human beings need a view of the world which offers “meaning and 
purpose” in relation to their “own being-in-the world” not just an objectivist scientific 
account.  Ecology and science have not always fully grasped this, he says (pp. 146-
151).   
 
Drilling down into our attachment to growth, eco-analysis considers three key 
concepts, namely need, desire and drive.  In terms of need, Bjerg notes that part of 
the justification for perpetual growth is the (asserted) need to feed current and future 
populations, particularly the poorest (p. 152).  It is hard to argue with this, Bjerg says:  
clearly the poor need feeding both now and in the future.  However, we need to 
question the often-asserted connection between growth and ‘the essential needs of 
the poor’.  Why?  Because ironically our commitment to feeding the poor, relying as it 
almost certainly will on practices which are destructive both of eco-systems and viable 
communities, will likely have the reverse effect.  “The poor,” Bjerg writes, exploring the 
case of Monsanto, “are in effect taken hostage by corporate interests in the struggle 
to define sustainable development”.  If the question is always posed as ‘how can we 
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move towards ecologically sustainable lifestyles and production in order to be able to 
feed a future global population in excess of 9 billion?’, it is as if the second part of the 
question cancels out the first part.  Eco-analysis wants us to concentrate on the first 
part of the question so as to think about solutions which point beyond the current 
growth imperative (p. 161).  Also important is that the alleged ‘iron bond’ between 
growth and the needs of the poor leaves unexplored the (highly open) question of 
whether such growth would actually help the poorest (because of the uneven 
distribution of growth). 
 
The second concept Bjerg looks at to understand our attachment to growth is desire.  
As we might expect, desire operates at the level of the individual consumer.  However, 
contrary to what neo-classical economics claims, it is not the case that ‘the economy’ 
is simply ‘responding to’ demand (or desire) – although this is partly true.  Rather, the 
economy itself creates desire.  Importantly, this points to a flaw in the green growth 
arguments, namely that technology does not just offer a route out of the environmental 
crisis as they claim but also fashions new wants and desires (e.g. twenty-five years 
ago none of us knew that we wanted to send and receive emails and texts every few 
minutes).   
 
Also crucial in understanding desire is the way in which the introduction of money has 
changed our very constitution as economic subjects.  Here Bjerg invokes the idea of 
‘economic castration’, namely that with money, production and consumption get 
separated (i.e. most of us do not consume the fruits of our labour).  However, the 
consequences of this are more profound than we realise.  That is, we no longer just 
desire ‘things’, we desire money to be able to access things (“the desire to be included 
in the economy as a whole”) (p. 167).  The result is that money becomes the cause of 
desire itself and because the desire for money cannot be exchanged for money, it 
remains unsatisfied (pp. 162-168).  
 
The third and final dimension to Bjerg’s investigation of our growth attachment is what 
he calls ‘drive’.  Drive operates at a systemic level and captures best of all the “self-
propelling nature of contemporary growth capitalism” (p. 193).  To explain what he 
means, Bjerg gives the example of a compulsive gambler.  In a gambling habit, which 
is under control, the aim is to win money.  However, when the habit gets out of control 
– like any addictive behaviour – this goal gets lost, and the aim of gambling is simply 
to gamble (i.e.  the gambler ‘finds satisfaction in endlessly repeating the same failed 
gesture’) (pp. 193-194).  Underlining the contrast between desire and drive, Bjerg says 
that while desire has a goal, the rhythm of drive is simply “failed repetition” (p. 194).  
To understand our fixation with growth we need to realise that something similar is 
going on in relation to the economy.  That is, our desire for perpetual economic growth 
is connected to our financial system where money is created out of interest-bearing 
debt by private banks – growth simply for its own sake (p. 197).  The operating of our 
financial system, Bjerg concludes, is where we need to focus our attention if we really 
want to save the planet.  This is striking and not an insight we get either from green 
growth or degrowth. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
By probing the question of why we are so attached to growth, Parallax of Growth 
introduces a new element to the debate which is not found in any of the other books 
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reviewed.  Green Capital and Rethinking Capitalism do not ask this question because 
they believe that technology and the knowledge economy will continue to drive growth 
but in a more sustainable manner.  Therefore, growth itself is not a problem.  
Degrowth, on the other hand, while being very clear that our attachment to growth is 
harmful, ironically leaves unexplored the question of why we are so attached to it.  
Given the depth of our attachment to growth – deep within the human psyche and 
embedded in our economic system – this is at the very least a strategic error, which 
will make far-reaching institutional and behaviour change next to impossible.   
 
In seeking to adjudicate between the different positions reviewed here, we would wish 
to emphasise that we probably should pursue technology and innovation as a route 
out of our current difficulties, and move to price natural capital.  However, if we do not 
probe the deeper question of why growth is so difficult to let go of, it is unlikely that 
these or any other responses to environmental challenges will ever go far enough.  
While there is clearly overlap with some earlier work (see Storm 2009), a key finding 
of this essay is that it is important to understand better our constitution as economic 
subjects and particularly the role money plays in the perpetuation of our desires.  More 
than this, we need to scrutinise more closely the way in which the global financial 
system operates, fuelling, as it does, a drive for growth for no other reason than growth 
itself.  To seriously address this dynamic of the financial sector requires far more 
radical reform than anything that has been considered post-2007/08, and yet the 
obstacles to achieving this are formidable.  However, unless we take action here, 
tackling the environmental challenges we face will continue to be an uphill struggle 
just as it has been since the publication of the Brundtland Report some thirty years 
ago.    
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